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While stakeholder models of corporate governance support long-term employment, recent 
reforms have promoted shareholder-oriented corporate governance worldwide.  Will reform 
cause employment to converge on a market system?  This paper presents a comparison of the 
linkages between corporate governance and employment patterns in 22 countries using the 
QCA method (Qualitative Comparative Analysis).  Case studies of Germany and Japan also 
show that firms must now cope with capital market pressures, but do so by creative adaptation 
of their existing national employment institutions.  International differences are thus growing 
smaller, but convergence will not occur in the foreseeable future.  
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1.  Two families of nations?  
Corporate governance has become increasingly important for students of labour.  Recent 
literature comparing national business systems has illustrated important linkages between 
finance, management, and industrial relations, as well as politics and law.  Most comparisons 
identify two types of systems—sometimes called market vs. relationship-oriented, or outsider 
vs. insider regimes.  These types reflect strong correlations between national capital market 
development (e.g. shareholder rights, market capitalisation, ownership dispersion, or merger 
and acquisition activity), industrial relations (e.g. co-ordination of wage bargaining and 
employment protection law) and employment (e.g. employee turnover) (Hall and Gingerich 
2001; Waldenberger 2003).  
Table 1 shows such correlations for 22 OECD countries in the mid-1990s.  Market-
oriented corporate governance such as ownership dispersion, market capitalisation, private 
pension funds, and M&A are associated with shorter employment tenure or corporate 
downsizing. Relational corporate governance coincides with more stable employment.  
However, these patterns are also correlated with patterns of legal regulation in each country.  
High ownership dispersion and M&A are associated with shareholders rights, and employee 
tenure with employment protection law.  Since few countries have strong legal rights for both 
shareholders and employees, it is difficult to tell whether linkages between corporate 






Table 1 here. 
 
Table 2 shows similar correlations across a pooled sample of listed firms in the same 22 
OECD countries. Overall the expected associations exist between ownership, share price 
volatility or price-book ratios (on the one hand) and rates of downsizing, divestments from 
capital assets, or average wages (on the other hand). However, the association is weaker 
among firms than for the country data.  One reason is that the relationships are not consistent 
across countries. No correlation exists between dispersed ownership and downsizing for firms 
in the US, UK, France or Sweden.  Concentrated ownership is associated with fewer 
employment cuts among Japanese firms, but with more (albeit small) cuts in employment at 
German firms.  One explanation is that the concentration measure picks up “stable 
shareholders” of corporate groups in Japan, but large blockholders, such as family owners, in 
Germany.  The former tend to support management, whereas the latter may provide a 
counterweight to employee interests.  There is no simple one-to-one relationship between 
corporate governance and employment. 
 





Most Anglo-Saxon countries are relatively homogeneous and market-oriented on most 
dimensions.  Few countries with strongly market-oriented corporate governance also have 
long-term employment.  Yet markets themselves come in various shapes and colours. The rise 
of “managerial capitalism” in the U.S. resulted from the separation of ownership and control 
in the 1920s, but was followed by a heyday for “welfare capitalism” for US employees in the 
post-war period (Jacoby 2004).  Later the 1980s hostile take-over wave led large 
conglomerates firms to end diversification strategies and reduce employment.  So whereas 
dispersed ownership first left much autonomy for management, it evolved into a market for 
corporate control threatening that autonomy. Post-war Japan also had dispersed ownership, 
but managers built dense networks of stable shareholding to suppress markets for corporate 
control. This freedom from capital market pressures came to be seen as an important 
prerequisite of the employee-oriented Japanese firm. 
Meanwhile, countries with relational corporate governance and employment are very 
diverse—equivalent functions may be played by different institutions.
1   For example, 
ownership may be concentrated relative to the U.S., but large owners have different identities 
such as families, inter-corporate networks, and banks.  Industrial relations may be co-
operative relative to market systems, but utilize diverse forms of unionism and labour-
management consultation.  Employment security may result from legal regulation, firm-
specific investments in training, or institutional opportunities for employees to exercise 




oriented characteristics.  Japan, the Netherlands, and Sweden have strong shareholder rights 
or high stock market capitalisation, but maintain co-operative industrial relations and 
employment security.  It is thus doubtful whether these countries belong to a single type.
2 
These differences are important for understanding the major changes underway in capital 
markets and corporate governance around the world.  Since the mid-1990s, corporate 
governance reform has spread across OECD countries.  The European Union (EU) has pushed 
member countries toward financial market liberalization. Stock markets became more 
important, and reforms have strengthened investor protection and accounting standards. In 
countries like Germany or Japan, the influence of banks in corporate finance has declined 
(Jackson 2003). Cross-border mergers and acquisitions have also risen.  These trends may be 
understood as a liberalization that has pushed relational or insider systems of corporate 
governance to be considerably more market-oriented.   
What impact do these changes in corporate governance have on labour management?  
Will corporate governance reform cause the convergence of employment and industrial 
relations on a market system?  Given the differences among stakeholder models, does, 
liberalization affect countries in different ways?   
In exploring these questions, Section 2 reviews economic theories relating corporate 
governance and labour management, as well as presents a sociological view on corporate 
governance as coalitions between investors, employees and management.  Section 3 presents 




(Qualitative Comparative Analysis based on Ragin 2000).  Section 4 presents a comparison of 
Germany and Japan.  The conclusion argues that international differences are growing smaller, 
but convergence will not occur in the foreseeable future. Firms must now cope with capital 
market pressures, but often do so by creative adaptation of their existing employment 
institutions. 
 
2.  From economic theory to the sociology of coalitions 
The linkages between 'corporate governance’ (CG) and 'labour management’ (LM) 
may be analysed in several directions:  CGÆLM, CGÅLM, or CGÅÆ LM.   Or the 
interaction of CG and LM may influence firm strategy and performance, or be complementary 
to other institutions such as welfare state arrangements (Jackson and Vitols 2001).   
The linkages between various dimensions of corporate governance and labour 
management have been conceived in different ways in economic theory.  First, transaction 
cost models suggests that commitment by investors to specific firms supports stable long-term 
employment, investment in worker training, and co-operative industrial relations (Hall and 
Soskice 2001). These institutional complementarities support dynamic (X-) efficiency in 
lower-volume, higher-quality product markets requiring high skills (Streeck 1992a, 1997b). 
Second, agency theory argues that employee rights increase the agency costs to diffuse 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1979) and reinforce the advantages of direct control 




For example, Roe (1999: 194) argues that, in countries like Germany, ‘diffuse owners may be 
unable to create a blockholding balance of power that stockholders would prefer as a 
counterweight to the employee block.’
3   Third, the economics of information and co-operation 
stress potential positive-sum aspects. For example, information and disclosure may enhance 
the prospect of voice for both investors and employees, thereby increasing the accountability 
of management (Hirschman 1972; Aoki 1988).  
Each model may represent only some aspect of economic exchange (Z1, Z2, Zn) that have 
potential trade-offs.  Strong labour participation may increase agency costs but lower 
transaction costs. Take-overs may lower agency costs, but increase transaction costs.  
Inferences about the overall complementarity between particular institutions remain 
challenging.
4   Likewise, we cannot tell a priori which dimension will drive overall 
performance.  For example, the relative costs of 'overinvestment’ by vested mangers vs. 
'underinvestment’ due to short-term investors depend on the life cycle of firms, sectors, and 
economies. Efficiency does not result from a universal “one best way,” but from comparative 
institutional advantages for different sorts of strategies (Hall and Soskice 2001).   
In coping with ambiguous trade-offs, investors, management, and employees may enter 
into coalitions.  This concept of corporate governance as coalition has important roots in 
economics (Aoki 1984), but also in sociological and political models of the firm (see Cyert 
and March 1963; Hoepner 2001; Aguilera and Jackson 2003).   The literature on coalitions 




example, shareholders may hold stakes for strategic purposes or purely financial interests.  
Employees differ in whether their skill formation and career prospects are firm-specific.  
Managers may have different interests across countries due to their educational backgrounds, 
career patterns and incentives schemes.  Boardrooms in different countries may require 
greater degrees of consensus building, delegation, or hierarchy.   Whether the interests of 
stakeholder groups overlap thus depends on the identities of each stakeholder and how their 
rights and responsibilities are institutionalized within society.   
Class coalitions may arise when the interests of capital and management oppose the 
interests of labour, particularly regarding distributional issues. Conflict centres on trade-offs 
between wages and profits, capital re-investments and dividends, or employment and 
shareholder returns. Employee ownership or contingent pay may help align employee 
interests with capital and lessen these conflicts. In the US, class conflict is common because 
shareholders are mostly finance-driven portfolio investors and management is also rewarded 
depends upon stock options and external career mobility.  In Japan, class conflict is less 
salient because cross-shareholding and main bank relationships act as strategic and committed 
investment that is complementary with lifetime employment (Aoki 1994).   
Insider-outsider coalitions may arise through cross-class alliances centred on stakeholder 
interests as members of a specific firm.  For example, large blockholders may have different 
interests than minority shareholders. Likewise, as producers at a particular firm, long-term 




professionals or craft-type labour.   An insider coalition may encompass only labour and 
management (insiders) in opposition to capital (outsiders) or may include a large blockholder 
or owner/manager as an insider.  Insiders may favour internal diversification ('empire 
building'), block efforts at restructuring, or erect take-over defences all to the potential 
disadvantage of outside investors.  Japanese corporations have strong insider coalitions 
among stable shareholders, strong enterprise-based unions and career managers.  German 
corporations are more subject to outside influence through codetermination law and 
centralized industrial unions. 
Finally, accountability coalitions concern the common interests of stakeholders to place 
management under effective checks and balances.  Shareholders and employees may form 
coalitions to remove poorly performing management or to demand higher corporate 
transparency. Accountability to different stakeholders is not a zero-sum relationship. In 
Germany, strong labour participation in the supervisory board complements blockholders who 
actively monitoring management.  
3.  Beyond correlation: studying diversity as institutional configurations  
The importance of different coalitions depends on the institutions in a given country.  But 
studying institutions raises methodological challenges. Due to institutionalized rules and 
beliefs, some corporate governance characteristics do not vary across firms within a country.  




and all firms in a given country face the same employment protection law. Thus, using 
traditional statistical models may be misleading, since an appropriate control group is lacking.    
Let us consider one example. Table 3 shows significant differences in the rate of corporate 
downsizing by country, as well as between firms with dispersed and concentrated ownership.  
However, Table 4 pools firms across 22 OECD countries and reports the results of a logit 
model predicting the likelihood of firms making a 10 per cent cut in employment between 
1992 and 2001.  After controlling for firm performance and industrial sector, country 
differences persist but the impact of ownership dispersion was no longer significant.
5   This 
illustration shows the difficulty of separating country effects from the marginal impact of 
ownership at the firm level.   
 
Tables 3 and 4 about here. 
 
Meanwhile, comparison across countries introduces too many institutional differences that 
cannot be held constant.  The number of OECD countries is small relative to the number of 
potential explanatory variables – the small N problem (Lijphart 1971; Ragin and Zaret 1983). 
Explanatory variables may be highly correlated with one another.  For example, no countries 
have strong legal protection for both investors and employees.  Moreover, linear models make 
assumptions about how variables combine based on their marginal effects while holding other 




complementarity (Aoki 2001) posit the effects of a variable to be contingent on the presence 
or absence of another.  It may be more realistic to see causation in terms of the conjunction or 
combination of multiple variables (Ragin 2000).  For all these reasons, traditional statistical 
methods may again be highly misleading.  Comparative research is thus often based on case 
studies with rich empirical detail, but limited generalisation.  
In an effort to bridge the gap between cases studies and cross-national correlations, this 
section briefly analyses the data from Table 1 using the new methodology of qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA) based on the logic of fuzzy sets.  QCA methods are tools for 
making inferences about necessary and sufficient conditions for an outcome (Ragin 2000).  
The empirical indicators from Table 1 were first re-scored between 0 and 1 according to the 
degree of membership in the conceptual category.
 6   A score of 1 represents a case that is 
‘fully in’ the category and 0 is ‘fully out.’  0.5 represents the transition point where a case is 
‘neither in, nor out.’  A condition may be considered necessary for an outcome when the 
membership score in the cause is consistently greater than or equal to membership in the 
outcome (e.g. all countries with ownership dispersion are members of the group of rich 
countries). When a sufficient condition is present, membership in the cause will be less than 
or equal to membership in the outcome (e.g. all rich countries have dispersed ownership).  A 
benchmark proportion is chosen to evaluate the probability that a condition is necessary or 




Five sets of labour outcomes are examined: employee representation in the board of 
directors, unionisation rate, the strictness of employment protection law, centralization of 
collective bargaining, and the rate of corporate downsizing. Tables 5 and 6 report the fuzzy-
set tests for whether the presence or absence of corporate governance variables are necessary 
and sufficient conditions for each of the five labour outcomes.  The coefficients show the 
proportion of cases meeting these conditions. No corporate governance variables were 
individually necessary or sufficient to produce any employment outcomes.  
However, some combinations of corporate governance variables are sufficient to 
produce labour outcomes.
7   The presence of a condition is indicated with CAPITAL letters, 
and the absence by lower case letters.  The membership score of countries in a given 
configuration was compared to the membership in the outcome to evaluate the “fit” of the 
causal conditions to each given case. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 here. 
 
(a) Employee representation at board level. One combination of factors proved sufficient 
for board-level codetermination: 
(a1)      INVESTOR RIGHTS + ACCOUNTING + dispersion + market value  




This pattern fits closely to Norway, Finland and other Scandinavian countries. This 
configuration links union centralization and low capital market development.  Weak capital 
markets may be interpreted in two ways – as a response to employee strength (as predicted by 
agency theory) or that because of weak capital markets political opposition to employee rights 
in the board was limited. Notably, employee representation is positively associated with 
investor rights and accounting, consistent with an accountability coalition. 
(b) Unionisation. The configuration with weak dispersion, investor rights and private 
pension funds proved sufficient for high unionization rates: 
(b1)      dispersion + investor rights + private pension fund development.  
 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Austria fit this pattern, but Scandinavian countries fit less well.  
Britain, Ireland, and Australia also have higher unionization than predicted. Thus, corporate 
governance seems to have little overall weight in explaining unionization rates. 
(c) Employment protection law. Many studies have noted the strong correlation of 
employment protection with corporate governance.  The absence of strong capital market 
activity is a necessary condition for employment protection law: 
(c1)    market capitalization + m&a  + private pensions  
One interpretation is that strong capital markets influence the politics of employment 
protection, or the situation is reverse such that employment protection constrains capital 




and UK.  Several configurations also proved to be sufficient for employment protection, but 
were a poor fit for countries with strong employment protection.  Another interesting finding 
is that legal rights for shareholders are neither necessary nor sufficient for strong employment 
protection. For example, Japan and Norway have moderately high investor protection and 
employment protection law, but an absence of high dispersion and M&A.   
(d) Centralization of collective bargaining. One configuration proved sufficient for 
centralization: 
(d1)   OWNERSHIP  CONCENTRATION  + investor protection + m&a 
These conditions had a very high degree of fit for centralized countries such as Belgium, 
Germany, Austria and Greece, but are also consistent with Sweden and Norway. This result 
supports the notion that ownership concentration and few legal rights for shareholders 
facilitate high co-ordination or co-operation among business that, in turn, facilitates multi-
employer bargaining (see Hall and Soskice 2001).  
(e) Downsizing. Capital market pressures are often thought to drive employee 
downsizing.  However, corporate governance factors alone were not necessary or sufficient 
for downsizing.  Many countries fall in the middle having moderate dispersion, but don’t have 
high downsizing rates - specifically, Ireland and Australia, but also to a lesser extent France, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands. The Netherlands appears to be an interesting case with highly 




However, downsizing rates cannot be consistently explained by industrial relations.  
Neither board representation, unionization or employment protection is necessary or sufficient 
for low downsizing rates. Countries with board representation such as Germany, Austria, 
Sweden, and Finland do not have particularly low downsizing rates. Countries with low 
unionization rates such as France and Spain nonetheless have low downsizing rates, whereas 
Finland and Sweden have strong unions but frequent downsizing. Employment protection law 
has the strongest relationship, but failed the test as a necessary condition:  Japan and Denmark 
have employment security ‘in excess’ of the legal index, whereas Spain and Italy have strong 
employment protection but higher downsizing rates. Downsizing is best explained by 
combining corporate governance and industrial relations variables as shown by two 
configurations: 
(e1)    DISPERSED OWNERSHIP + PRIVATE PENSIONS + unionization 
(e2)    PRIVATE PENSIONS + M&A + unionization 
Both configurations associate downsizing with low unionization rates together with strong 
capital market pressure by private pensions plus ownership dispersion or high merger activity.   
(f) Market vs. Relational Types.  An additional analysis was done by looking at the 
degree to which countries conformed to pure market vs. relational systems by aggregating 
their membership across several measures (e.g. the degree to which a county has high market 
capitalisation, high mergers AND high private pensions).  The absence of market-oriented 




explain it.  However, strongly relational corporate governance is not necessary or sufficient 
condition for relational employment. This suggests that, at the extreme, market-oriented 
systems may place a serious constrain on relational employment institutions.  Yet more mixed 
corporate governance systems may be compatible with a variety of employment patterns.  
Conversely, the absence of relational employment is necessary for strong capital market 
development, but not sufficient to explain it. This again suggests that vested stakeholder 
rights impede capital market developments only at the extreme.  
In sum, in the extreme case, strongly market-oriented corporate governance may 
indeed prevent a country from developing strongly relational employment, and vice-versa. 
But corporate governance factors alone do not explain the diversity of employment patterns 
across countries. Nor do employment institutions explain the strength of capital market 
development or patterns of ownership across countries, as suggested by Roe (2003) or 
Pagano and Volpin (1999). Rather, corporate governance appears “loosely coupled” to 
employment in a way that allows a wide range of intermediate cases combining elements of 
market and relational systems 
These findings have several other implications. First, shareholder rights appear quite 
neutral toward systems of relational employment.  In particular, employee participation is 
compatible with strong investor protections. Second, ownership dispersion itself has no direct 
link to labour outcomes, but only impacts employment when combined with strong M&A or 




other than facilitating centralized collective bargaining. Third, the degree of capital market 
activity by pension funds or through M&A has the strongest direct effect on employment 
outcomes.   
 
4.  National Trajectories:  A Brief Comparison of Germany and Japan 
The above analysis confirms the existence of linkages between corporate governance and 
labour management, especially of strongly market-oriented corporate governance.  Yet many 
countries have mixed or hybrid corporate governance systems that appear compatable with a 
range of employment and industrial relations patterns.  Since the mid-1990s, many OECD 
countries implemented corporate governance reforms and promoted capital markets.  How 
will financial liberalization and greater attention to “shareholder value” impact labour 
management?   
This section compares recent changes in two very different models of “stakeholder” 
corporate governance: Germany and Japan.  Historically, These corporate governance systems 
had many similarities: bank finance and monitoring, the absence of hostile takeovers, 
moderate executive pay, management cultures based on consensus, emphasis on product 
quality and long-term strategy rather than financial returns, and so on.  “Patient” owners and 
long-term management was thought to be supportive of long-term employment, since short-
term returns are sacrificed to build stable relationships.  But on the labour side, important 




codetermination through works councils and board representation. Meanwhile, Japan has 
enterprise unionism and a much more informal practice regarding employee consultation in 
corporate decisions.   
In the last decade, corporate governance has begun to change.  As European markets 
integrate, German universal banks have shifted their strategy toward investment banking 
(Deeg 2001) activities that require them to reduce their large ownership stakes and play a less 
active role in governance in the boardroom. Ties with Japanese main banks have also 
weakened, and sparked substantial unwinding of stable cross-shareholdings since the mid-
1990s.  The erosion of bank power in Japan is, quite unlike Germany, driven by the particular 
context of post-‘Bubble’ asset deflation, the non-performing loan issue, and changes in 
accounting which now put banks at greater risk by reporting the current market values of 
long-term holdings.  
Meanwhile ownership by foreign institutional investors is increasingly in large companies.  
Here direct monitoring by banks is being replaced by indirect monitoring via the market—for 
most foreign institutional investors exit is more important than voice.  One paradoxical 
consequence is that the discretionary power of top managers may potentially increase.  Of 
course, mangers also have growing incentives to raise share prices in order to gain external 
finance. But the sanctioning power of the market may depend upon a “market for corporate 




that takeovers are becoming an increasing threat in Germany (sere Hoepner and Jackson 
2001), but much less so in Japan.   
Germany and Japan have also implemented substantial corporate governance reforms (see 
Jackson 2003).  The uses of corporate equity was liberalized to facilitate spin-offs, 
acquisitions through share swaps, share buy-backs, and stock options as am element of 
executive compensation   Market-oriented accounting rules have been encouraged.  Germany 
has retained its board system that separates management and monitoring functions into two-
tiers.  However, several innovations were introduced by a 1998 corporate law reform to better 
define monitoring functions and promote greater use of committees in the Supervisory Board.  
Further details were then codified in the recent German Code of Corporate Governance and 
enforced by a new soft-law comply-or-explain approach.  Meanwhile, Japanese boards have 
lacked any parallel to this two-tiered structure. Reforms aimed to promote the role of outside 
monitoring by revamping the traditional system of statutory auditors, and finally, in 2002, 
giving the legal option to adopt a “company with committees” system with outsider board 
members involved in committees for compensation, nomination and auditing. 
Corporate governance is thus becoming more shareholder-oriented.  However, 
management strategies aimed at promoting “shareholder value” interests may provoke a 
number of conflicts with employees.  First, implementing corporate disclosure and market-
oriented accounting may reduce company reserves and favour higher distribution of profits to 




competencies that leads to conflicts with employees over the definition of core business units, 
divestment or closure of non-core units, and strategies of growth by diversification used to 
stabilize employment. Third, equity-oriented performance targets create conflicts over 
performance criteria, time horizons, and disciplining poorly performing units.  Fourth, 
performance-oriented pay may be used to link employee incentives with business unit 
performance, raising issues of the equity and risks of contingent pay.   Managerial stock 
options may also provoke controversy over income inequality and short-termism.  In sum, all 
these factors create pressure to match employment to market conditions by reducing excess 
employment, divesting from less profitable businesses and decentralizing bargaining to match 
wages to productivity.   
In Germany and Japan, the strong “voice” of employees has not, in itself, prevented 
corporate governance reform.  Greater checks and balances and better information may 
enhance the prospects for voice by both investors and employees.  Thus, Japanese unions and 
German works councils have supported selected reforms.  In Japanese firms exposed to 
capital market pressure, strong employee participation via labour-management councils had 
no positive or negative impact on adopting stronger information disclosure and shareholder 
rights, and had a positive effect on board reforms (see Miyajima 2004). Rengo also advocates 
greater disclosure on issues such as executive pay, and better disclosure of pension liabilities.  
Likewise, German works council members favour greater information disclosure and 




participation (Section 3) also suggested that stakeholder influence is compatible with 
coalitions that promote greater corporate accountability.   
The impact of shareholder-value strategies on employment in Germany has been studied 
by several projects at the Max-Planck-Institute for the Study of Societies (see Jackson et al. 
2004).  Beyer and Hassel (2002) first examined the distribution of net value-added among 
stakeholders.  They found that the adoption of shareholder-value
8 was associated with 
increasing share of dividends and a lower share for labour.  Meanwhile, ownership dispersion 
positively influenced dividends but had no direct impact on labour.  High shareholder value 
was also associated with a decrease in total employment due to corporate restructuring.  
Despite strong employment protection law and participation rights of works councils, German 
corporations engage in more downsizing than Japanese firms (see Table 3).  Employment 
adjustment is still achieved through “benevolent” methods such as early retirement, rather 
than lay-offs.  The German welfare state helps firms and works councils to externalise the 
costs of adjustment through state sponsored programs.  However, this “externalisation” is 
placing increasing burdens on the welfare state, contributing to very high non-wage labour 
costs and unemployment.  Divestment from business lines is another way of reducing 
employment. Here works councils may support the independence of core business, while 
using their influence to promote “good buyers” who offer employment prospects. Meanwhile, 
the shrinking labour share of value-added is associated with an increase in average 




It is therefore not too surprising that works councils often cooperate with corporate 
restructuring.  Shareholder-value is not leading to direct class conflict so much as a new type 
of insider-outsider conflict.  On the one hand, participation in restructuring involves works 
councils in the ‘co-management’ of important decisions and is thus reinforces the co-
operative character of German codetermination (Hoepner 2001).  On the other hand, the 
character of codetermination is changing. Codetermination is becoming less of an 
encompassing and solidaristic political and legal institution guaranteed by law.  Rather, the 
contents and boundaries of codetermination are increasingly ‘contractual.’ Works councils 
protect a shrinking core of “good jobs.”  Works councils thus face a latent conflict between 
core ‘insider’ employees and peripheral ‘outside’ employees whose interests are divided 
across weaker versus stronger business units. 
A similar insider coalition emerges around performance-based pay.  Shareholder-value 
management is strongly associated with adoption of performance-based pay schemes linking 
salaries to business and/or individual performance (Jackson et al. 2004).  Normally wages in 
German are set by industry-wide collective bargaining that greatly constrain wage 
differentials between firms.  Performance pay has not replaced these existing pay schemes, 
but come ‘on-top’ of rates set by centralized industry-level collective bargaining.  This again 
reinforces co-operation among company “insiders.”  But the new layer of pay schemes 




Consequently, strengthening such insider coalitions comes at some expense of solidarity 
across firms and a lesser consideration of societal interests “outside” the firm.   
Japan faces many similar pressures, but some different results.  As a tentative comparison, 
the Development Bank of Japan database was used to calculate distribution of net value-
added of listed Japanese firms.  Unlike Germany, the median labour share rose from around 
69% in 1990-93 to just over 79% in 2000-2002 (own calculations, but see also Hyuga 2001).
8  
The median dividend share remained steady at around 2.9%.  Japanese firms still favour 
policies of paying stable dividends as a fixed charge on revenue.  Matsuura (2001) also finds 
that Japanese firms cutting employment also cut dividends—very few firms redistributed 
wealth by reducing employment while raising dividends.  The increasing labour share resulted 
from lower interest payments as bank debt was repaid, as well as fewer taxes due to low 
profitability.  
To examine the impact of corporate governance, bivariate regressions were calculated to 
examine how corporate ownership influences changes in distributional shares. Foreign 
ownership had a positive effect on changes in the share of dividends. Meanwhile, changes in 
the labour share were associated with ownership by financial institutions, other firms and 
individuals—but negatively related to high ownership dispersion.  Although statistically 
significant, all the effects on changes in the share of value-added were very small and are not 




As in Germany, large Japanese firms reduced total employment but increased their 
average wages.  The largest firms (based on the 99
th percentile) had over 22,974 employees in 
1993, but just 17,417 in 2002 (own calculations, DBJ database).   At those same firms, 
average wage costs increased from just over 20 million to about 23.6 million yen per 
employee.  Table 3 also shows the large increase in downsizing over the last decade, although 
the level remains very low.  Several studies also show that corporate governance 
characteristics impact the propensity for employment adjustment.  For example, Ahmadjian 
and Robinson (2001) show a positive impact of foreign ownership on downsizing.  
Meanwhile, strong ties to banks slowed or lessened the likelihood of reducing employment 
(see also Abe 2002, Matsuura 2001).   
Nonetheless, Japanese firms remain committed to a modified form of employment 
security (see Kato 2001).  First, labour market data show that job retention rights show no 
major decline since the 1980s. Second, recent surveys of top management express continued 
commitment of long-term employment policies by a vast majority of firms (Miyajima 2004).  
A 2003 “Survey on the Corporate System and Employment” by the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry also suggests that 80% of firms maintain lifetime employment.  My 
preliminary analysis of this data suggests that corporate governance characteristics (e.g. 
foreign ownership, equity-based performance targets, outside directors) had no influence on 
the likelihood of maintaining lifetime employment in some form, nor on using layoffs to 




intensifying transfers, hiring freezes and early retirement.  Outright dismissals of domestic 
employees are usually avoided.  
Given the continued legal supports, restructuring has often reinforced co-operation 
between management and unions in large firms. Legal protection of employment in Japan 
remains significant (see Araki 2004).  Protection is largely based on case law doctrines of the 
“abuse of the right to dismiss.”  Recent court cases suggest some important loosening of the 
standards being applied to judge abuse.  Yet the 2003 revision of the Labour Standards Law 
symbolically reaffirmed the case law doctrine as part of statutory law for the first time.  
Meanwhile, other recent legal changes have supported the participation of labour in 
restructuring.  A key example is the Labour Contract Succession Law of 2000 to guarantee 
the transfer of employment conditions and collective agreements during mergers or spin-offs.   
Corporate restructuring thus seems to occur in ways consistent with a modified notion of 
stakeholder corporate governance.  However, co-operative restructuring also has costs and 
limits for firms. The less developed Japanese welfare state means that firms cannot easily 
externalise the costs of adjustment.  As firms internalise high adjustment costs, one 
hypothesis is that restructuring has been slower and damped profitability more than in 
Germany. The benefits of transfers of employees to related companies may be diminishing as 
a result of corporate governance reforms that introduced consolidated accounting procedures 




Increased corporate restructuring also creates new problems for Japanese unions. Unlike 
German works councils, Japanese enterprise unions lack legal rights for participation. 
Participation depends upon informal social norms, as well as maintaining union strength 
through high membership.  The case of NTT shows that Japanese unions may depend upon 
defending the boundary of the firm or corporate group in order to internalize employment 
adjustment processes across various business units (Sako and Jackson 2004). Another 
difference is that the lack of German-style multi-employer wage agreements may mean that 
enterprise-based unions may also be more willingly to accept direct or indirect forms of pay 
cuts in order to assure job security.  Major firms such as Mitsubishi Materials and Kobe Steel 
implemented flat-rate cuts, while other firms such as NTT and Keio Electric Railway created 
new regional subsidiaries with lower wages.  
On the issue of performance-based pay, Japanese unions do not face the German problem 
where performance pay threatens “equal pay for equal work” across firms under centralised 
collective agreements. A Ministry of Finance survey in 2002 identifies three types of pay 
systems—50% of firms maintain traditional lifetime-employment and seniority pay, 29% 
utilise performance-based pay with lifetime employment and 16% utilise performance pay 
without lifetime employment (Miyajima 2004).   For many firms, therefore, performance-
based is being implemented in a context of stable internal career patterns.  Morishima (2002) 
suggests that performance pay is not an alternative system, but simply a new element used in 




pay, given the complexity of evaluating individual performance.  Also, performance based 
pay in Japan thus far appears to be based on individual performance—only 19% of firms 
surveyed by the Japan Productivity Center for Socio-Economic Developed in 2000 used 
variable pay based on company performance.  This may explain my preliminary research 
finding based on the METI “Survey on the Corporate System and Employment” that shows 
corporate governance had no effect on the implementation of performance-based systems per 
se, since these often exist alongside traditional employment features.  Shareholder-oriented 
performance targets and outside directors slightly increased the likelihood of employment 
based entirely on merit without any lifetime employment.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
The linkages between corporate governance and labour management will remain an 
exciting subject. National differences still matter. Despite common international trends, 
convergence on a single model remains far away.  Germany and Japan have thus far been able 
to adapt and modify a strong role of labour in the corporation. The size of the core 
“stakeholder” model is getting smaller, but is unlikely to disappear.  Performance pay is also 
being used to modify existing wage systems, and firms attempt to adjust levels of 
employment while maintaining a basic commitment to job security.  For better or worse, the 




rapidly adapted their stakeholder model toward greater shareholder value than in Japan.  But 
this adaptation comes at a price of greater “social closure” of the corporation. 
Both Germany and Japan contrast to cases where labour plays a weaker role in the firm. 
But corporate governance reforms in France, Spain, and Italy seem to reinforce the weakness 
of labour (see Gospel and Pendleton 2004).  Here labour strength is rooted in centralized 
collective bargaining and employment protection law, but lacks the institutions for 
participation in the firm needed to renegotiate the stakeholder relationship.  The future 
success of stakeholder systems depends on finding ways for strong employee ‘voice’ in the 
firm to be used alongside investor pressure to promote greater corporate accountability.  This 
paper has shown that there is nothing antithetical in extending strong legal rights to both 
shareholders and employees.  For labour management to be complementary to corporate 
governance, employment should not simply responds quickly to the forces of the capital 
market.  Rather, labour participation may also help constrain the excesses and short-term 
failures of such markets. It remains to be seen whether organized labour can play a role in 
promoting an ‘enlightened’ version of shareholder-value that can stress the positive-sum 
aspects of corporate governance. But the prospects for such a model will have a very real and 




Table 1  Correlation of corporate governance and labour management in OECD countries 
in the mid-1990s 
________________________________________________________________________ 
   Employee   Unionization  Employment   Long term   Downsizing 
  board     protection  law  employment  rate 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Corporate governance indicators 
 
Dispersion
a  -.18  -.03    -.60*  -.69*  .33 
Concentration
b   .04   .05   .51*  .35  -.33 
Family owner
c -.21    .03  .35  .09  -.09 
Investor rights
d -.21  -.13  -.54*  -.52*  .13 
Accounting rules
e .14  .30  -.58*  -.38  .39 
Private pensions
f    -.23  -.08        -.63*  -.47*  .10 
Market cap.
g -.34  -.20  -.48*  -.33  .48* 
M&A
h -.16    .24  -.53*  -.56*  .46* 
Bank restrictions
i-.30  -.18  -.07 .06 .08 
State banks





k  1  - -  - -   - -   - -    
Unionisation
l    .56*  1  - -   - -   - -    
EPL
m  .20  -.06  1  - -   - -      
LTE
n  .16  -.03  .71*  1  - -  
Downsizing rate
o-.20 .00  -.34  -.40  1 
 
a  Dispersion =  percentage of listed firms with less than 25% of their shares ‘closely held’.  
b  Concentration = the average percentage of shares held by the top 3 shareholders.  
c  Family ownership =  percentage of top firms with a family owner holding a block of 
10% or more.   
d  Investor Protection = index of anti-director rights.   
e  Accounting =  strictness of accounting standards.   
f  Private Pensions =  assets of pension funds as percentage of GDP.   
g  Market Cap. = stock market capitalisation as percentage of GDP.   
h  M&A = value of mergers and acquisitions as percentage of GDP, average 1990-1995.   
I  Bank restrictions = index of restrictions on banks holding corporate equities.   
j State banks =  assets of state-owned banks as percentage of GDP.   
k  Employee Board = index of representation on corporate board.   




m  EPL=OECD Index of Employment Protection Legislation.   
n  LTE = Long-term employment, based on average tenure of male employees in years.   
o  Downsizing rate = percentage of firms making a cut of 10% of more in total 
employment, average 1991-2001.   
Notes *Indicates significance at the .05 level.   
Sources:  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Schleifer (1999), Barth, Caprio, and Levin 
(2000), OECD (1997), http://www.fibv.com, SDC Platinum Worldwide Merger, 




Table 2  Correlation of corporate governance and labour outcomes: firm-level measures 
for 1992-2001 
________________________________________________________________________ 
      Employment   10%   5%      Average     
     Growth
j  employment  employment    wage
l      
       Cut
k cut




a    0        .      04*     .03*      0       
% Closely-held shares
b    . 01 -.03*  -.02*  .02*   
△ Closely- held shares
c    -.02* 0 .01* 0   
Price volatility
d                .01  .12*  .10*  -.07*   
Price-book ratio
e                0  -.01  -.02*  -.01   
Dividend yield
f                0  0  .01*  -.01   
△ Dividend as % VA
g         0 .04*  .03*  .01   
Sale of stock options
h      -.01  0  0  .10*   
Disposal of fixed assets
i   -.01 .05* .05* .05*   
________________________________________________________________________ 
a Dispersed ownership = equals 1 if less than 25% of total shares are not closely held.  
b Closely-held shares = percentage of shares held by insiders or other stable owners based 
on various national definitions.   
c △ Closely-held shares = percentage change in percentage of shares held by insiders or 
stable owners.   
d  Price volatility = index of share price volatility.    
e Price-book ratio = ratio of total market capitalization to the book value of total assets.  
f Dividend yield = dividends per share as a percentage of average share price.  
g△ Dividend as percentage of value-added = percentage change in share of dividends as a 
percentage of total firm value-added.    
h Sale of stock options = total value of stock options exercized in U.S. Dollars.   
i Disposal of fixed assets = total value of fixed assets sold as a percentage of total assets.   
j Employment growth = annual percentage change in total employees.  
k Employment cut = equals 1 if negative change in percentage employees was greater than 
10% or 5% in a given year.  
l Average wage = total salary and benefit expense divided by the number of employees.   
Notes:  Own calculations from Thomson/Worldscope Database. This dataset covers all 
listed firms with over 2,000 employees in 22 OECD countries. Number of observations in the 




Table 3   Rates of corporate downsizing for selected countries, 1991-2001 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Country  10% cut  10% cut  Average annual  Cumulative  
  2001  1991  rate 1999-2001  likelihood for 
      each  firm   
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Australia .099  .057  .093  .301 
Canada .094  .212  .096  .312 
France .083  .079  .069**  .306 
Germany .093  .099  .101  .402 
Italy .147  .088  .096  .413 
Japan .059  .020  .041**  .213 
Korea .140  .104  .153**  .548 
Netherlands .070  .077  .065*  .351 
Spain .015  .122  .077 .292 
Sweden .154 .276  .095  .384 
Switzerland .131  .096  .091  .426 
UK .179  .164  .129**  .473 
US .206  .092  .106**  .445 
Dispersed --  --  .105**  -- 
Concentrated --  --  .082**    -- 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes. Sample covers listed corporations with over 2,000 employees. Downsizing is counted 
as a negative shift in total employment of 10% over a one year period. Cumulative likelihood 
is calculated as the probability of each firm within the sample undergoing one or more 
employment cuts within the time period.  N=33,094 firm-years.   
* T-test for the difference of means with the overall sample is significant at 0.05  
**Significant at 0.01 




Table 4   Logit model of the likelihood of a 10% cut in employment,  
selected countries in 2001 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Odds ratio     Standard error       z    Significance 
___________________________________________________________________________     
Assets (ln)   .9174195     .0368193      -2.15     0.032     
ROA (t-1)   .9895516     .0023990   -4.33  0.000      
Sales Growth   .9391732     .0036168   -16.30    0.000  
Dispersed       1.000280       .1923223       0.00   0.999      
Closely-held    .9968440      .0039829      -0.79   0.429      
France       .5290478     .1611784   -2.09  0.037     
Germany      .5609505     .1637352   -1.98  0.048    
Netherlands    .4319714      .2151003      -1.69  0.092      
Japan      .3223691     .0620804   -5.88  0.000    
UK   1.018149     .1782022       0.10     0.918      
Spain      .1444043     .1476633  -1.89    0.058     
Italy      1.219077     .4264672  0.57  0.571 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Diagnostics: n = 3414; LR chi
2  = 546.15; Chi
2 significance = 0.000; Log-likelihood = -
1181.966; Pseudo R
2 = 0.1877 
Notes:  The base model includes data from firms in 22 countries.  This table reports 7 selected 
country dummies using the USA as a baseline. Controls for general industrial classification 
are not reported. 
Source:  Company data taken from Thomson/Worldscope Database.  The sample includes all 
listed firms with over 2,000 employees in each country.   
 




Table 5  Results of fuzzy-set test: necessary conditions 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Measure  Cause >=   Cause >=  Cause >=  Cause >=  Cause >= 
 employee  unionisation  employment  downsizing  collective 
 representation    protection    bargaining 
        centralization 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Ownership  
dispersion  .25  .41 .53 .50 .33 
  - owner  .50  .59  .79  .50  .44 
Investor  
protection  .42  .55 .53 .56 .28 
  - investor  .58  .59  .68  .61  .50 
Accounting  rules  .58  .64 .58 .67 .44 
  - accounting  .25  .36  .37  .33  .11 
Private  pensions  .33  .36 .37 .50 .33 
  - pension  .75  .64  .84 (.46)  .67  .50 
Market  
capitalization  .42  .41 .37 .44 .28 
  - market cap  .42  .45  .79  .50  .61 
M&A  .42  .45 .42 .67 .28 
  - m&a  .67  .55  .74  .61  .50 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note:  The level of significance for all proportions > .80 is listed in parentheses.  An 
adjustment factor of .17 was used in determining membership in each set.  The – sign denotes the 




Table 6  Results of fuzzy-set test: sufficient conditions 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Measure    Cause <=   Cause <=  Cause <=  Cause <=   
    employee  unionization employment downsizing 
 representation    protection   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Ownership dispersion .55  .68  .68  .64 
  - owner  .50  .50  .68  .55 
Investor protection  .41  .64  .59  .50 
  - investor  .41  .55  .50  .50 
Accounting rules  .45  .50  .55  .55 
  - accounting  .55  .68  .82  .64 
Private pensions  .45  .82  .64  .68 
  - pension  .41  .45  .41  .45 
Market capitalisation  .41  .59  .55  .54 
  - market cap  .41  .55  .50  .45 
M&A .50  .68  .59  .68 
  - m&a  .41  .64  .45  .50 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note: All proportions greater than .80 (using an adjustment factor of .17) and .65 were tested 
for significance, P<=.05.  The – sign denotes the absence of the particular factor. 
 
 





1. On the concept of functional equivalence, see Merton (1949). 
2. Indeed many different labels are used such as insider, relationship-oriented, stakeholder, or 
co-ordinated economies.   The quality of such typologies depends on identifying the empirically 
and theoretically relevant dimensions of variation.  A different clustering of countries would 
result if different variables were included, such as whether unions are organized around industry, 
occupation / craft, or enterprise lines. 
3. German codetermination is sometimes argued to promote poor managerial accountability 
by dividing the supervisory board into factional benches, diluting the board’s overall powers and 
promoting collusion between management and employees (Roe 1999). 
4. See Aoki (2001) on the concept of complementarity. This concept is widely used within 
discussion of corporate governance to specify the increased returns to an institution in particular 
combination with another institution.  
5. After controlling for various performance variables but no country variables, the odds of 
downsizing increase by a factor of 1.27 for dispersed firms relative to concentrated firms.  
6. This analysis draws on data from another project with Ruth Aguilera on determinants of 
corporate ownership. Further details on the dataset, coding of membership scores, and the 
method of analysis can be found in Jackson and Aguilera (2004). 
7. Unless otherwise noted, the test for sufficiency required a proportion of positive cases to 
exceed 80 per cent and achieve a significance of .05. An adjustment of 0.17 (generally 
equivalent to one degree of membership) was allowed to control for measurement error.  
8.  Hoepner (2001) developed a shareholder value index based upon several dimensions 
including information disclosure, equity-oriented management incentives and the use of equity-
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